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Pseudo-rationalism
Rationalism is a philosophy in which a high regard is given to reason (specifically logical reasoning). Pseudo-rationalism is a term used to describe a set of ideas which persistently presents itself as (or is mistaken as) being derived from the proper application of rationalism, while it does not meet the criteria to be properly called such, since fallacious reasoning is too overabundant within it, and especially if the fallacious reasoning indefeasibly persists even when met with attempts to correct or point out its flaws. In convention, just any deployment of rationalism which by mistake contains fallacious reasoning is not necessarily called pseudo-rationalism, as similarly an honest attempt at science which fails at properly using its tools is not necessarily referred to as pseudo-science. Pseudo-rationalism, which is partially synonymous with fallacious reasoning, refers to persistent or important failures in attempts at using the tool that is rationalism, especially in regards to the failure being persistent to such an extent that it is a relatively defining thought pattern of the group or entity that attempts it, so as to the such as in attempts at Marxist communities where the attempts led to catastrophic results. Pseudo-rationalism is thus relatively synonymous with the ideological attempt at realising the imagined favorable result of a logically incoherent dogma. Pseudo-rationalism is over-belief in one's own or some entity's attempt at reasoning. Over-belief is an error of thought and such error of thought often leads to misfortune, such as fallacious reasoning or worse something like the disastrous so-called Chinese Great Leap Forward. It is the persistent mistaking of seemingly sound reasoning for actually sound reasoning in attempts at rationalism. It features the belief in (or assertion of) proof where there is none and the overvaluing of evidence when it is poor. Pseudorationalism invests in thought where there is seemingly sound verbiage, which when technologically tested or looked at by a better thinker, turns out to have misled the investor, who may have been tempted into delusion by his hope for the desired outcome. Pseudo-rationalism seems invariably to be driven by over-motivated reasoning (which is commonly known, but poorly named, as simply "motivated reasoning" --- as if there is any reasoning without motivation). The defining feature of pseudo-rationalism is of course an exhibition of (or anyway a support of) pseudo-rationality, which is the mere pretense or appearance of rationality, as opposed to actual rationality. Such pretense is often seen in social performance, such as in attempts at virtue signaling: * Overly signaling scepticist stances, or even being overly skeptical * Always fighting for the truth, even when you’re burning more social capital than the argument is worth Being overly skeptical leads to a loss of concept resolution, since it sacrifices information or structure, for sentimental self- or social signaling, while being overly faithful operates for the same end, but instead of sacrificing information or structure, it overinvests in it. Such signaling attempts can be motivated by the desire to appear rational or anyway socially valuable. The motivation for such appearance hopes can lead to claims of closure where closure does not exist in the logics, even with appeal to the next dimension (empiricism). In other words sophisms, no matter how skilled. The pseudo-rationalist in the interest of appearing rational, has forced a conclusion out of insufficient evidence "on the basis of inadequate premises of whose deficiencies he is unaware" or is politically ignoring. Even worse, "because he thinks he has decided rationally," or because it seems to him that he profits from appearing to have done so, "he may be supremely confident in his decision," even though it may be logically no more justified than any other. Pseudo-rational deployment is often seen in dogmatico-ideological rationalism (thoroughly documented in the case of Marxism), or what Chapman calls ideological rationality, stating that "ideological rationality tries to force reality to fit categories—and that does not end well"---but one wonders if the term irrationality isn't more fitting to refer to such false pretense to rationality, since the attempts are irrational after all. See related: Social performance of rationality; Virtue signaling. Branching * Rationalism Reason * Nihilism; Delusion; Ideology * Bias; Error; Degeneration of thinking; Fallacious reasoning; Logical fallacies; Errors of thought * Overassumption * Reasoning; Types of reason; Contemplative reason Article sources: Neurath; Popper; Chapman; Doolittle; Kapelner; Leong; Eiríksson Definitions “We to distinguish between a true rationalism and a false or a pseudo-rationalism. What I shall call the ‘true rationalism’ is the rationalism of Socrates. It is the awareness of one’s limitations, the intellectual modesty of those who know how often they err, and how much they depend on others even for this knowledge. It is the realization that we must not expect too much from reason; that argument rarely settles a question, although it is the only means for learning—not to see clearly, but to see more clearly than before. What I shall call ‘pseudo-rationalism’ is the intellectual intuitionism of Plato. It is the immodest belief in one’s superior intellectual gifts, the claim to be initiated, to know with certainty, and with authority. According to Plato, opinion—even ‘true opinion’, as we can read in the Timaeus —’ is shared by all men; but reason’ (or ‘intellectual intuition’) ‘is shared only by the gods, and by very few men’. This authoritarian intellectualism, this belief in the possession of an infallible instrument of discovery, or an infallible method, this failure to distinguish between a man’s intellectual powers and his indebtedness to others for all he can possibly know or understand, this pseudo-rationalism is often called ‘rationalism’, but it is diametrically opposed to what we call by this name.” Popper, Karl. 2011 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge. (p. 433)